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MEI-GSR Holdings, LLC v. Peppermill Casinos, Inc., 134 Nev., Adv. Op. 31 (May 3, 2018)1
Intellectual Property Law: Trade Secrets
Summary
The Court held that jury instructions must be aligned with a Nevada statute if the Nevada
statute has plain meaning via “facially clear” language. Further, the Court determined there must
be discretionary abuse by a district court if an appellate court over rules its decision regarding a
motion to amend, a motion to compel discovery, a motion for case concluding sanctions, or a
motion in limine regarding evidence. The Court concluded that NRS 600A.060 does not preclude
a court from awarding attorney fees via other appropriate statutes.
Background
MEI-GSR Holdings, LLC, who owns the Grand Sierra Resort and Casino (GSR), caught
Peppermill Casino, Inc. employee Ryan Tors in July 2013 using a slot machine key on machines
at its GSR property to access par values. The Nevada Gaming Control Board (NGCB) investigated
Tors and Peppermill. It revealed that Peppermill executives had encouraged Tors’ conduct since
2011. The NGCB did not find that Peppermill used par values from any casinos to adjust its slot
machines and Peppermill agreed to a $1 million fine.
GSR filed suit against Tors and Peppermill on August 2, 2013 for violating the National
Trade Secrets Act (NTSA). GSR and Peppermill engaged in discovery with regard to Peppermill’s
emails between executives that the NGCB obtained during its investigation. GSR was never fully
satisfied with the discovery decisions by the district court. A jury trial ensued, where GSR offered
a proposed jury instruction with a definition for the term “trade secret” that did not align with NRS
600A.030. The district court rejected GSR’s jury instruction and instructed the jury that someone
who obtained information by reverse engineering does not have liability because reverse
engineering is a proper way to obtain and discover information.
The jury returned a verdict which favored Peppermill, finding that stolen par values are not
“trade secrets” via NRS 600A.030 because GSR did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that par values are not readily ascertainable by proper means. Peppermill filed a motion for
attorney’s fees and costs, when GSR rejected Peppermill’s offer of judgment and desire to obtain
a better judgment via NRCP 68. The district court awarded Peppermill attorney fees and entered
an amended judgment in Peppermill’s favor. The district court denied GSR’s motion for a new
trial. GSR appealed.
Discussion
In GSR’s appeal, it argued that the district court erred by instructing the jury in regard to
trade secrets under NRS 600A.030 by: denying to amend GSR’s complaint; denying GSR’s
motions to compel Peppermill to reveal all emails that the NGCB obtained during its Peppermill
investigation; denying GSR’s motion which asked for case-concluding sanctions; excluding
evidence that showed Peppermill stole par values from other casinos; and awarding Peppermill
attorney’s fees under NRCP 68.
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Whether the district court erred in instructing the jury concerning trade secrets under NRS
600A.030
GSR argued that the district court did not properly instruct the jury under NRS 600A.030.
It argued that the statute makes it impossible for a defendant to show that information is readily
ascertainable and not a trade secret, when the defendant stole the information. GSR did not show
that its offered jury instruction aligned with Nevada law2 by demonstrating that NRS 600A.030’s
statutory language, which is “facially clear,” coincided with GSR’s jury instructions. Under this
situation, the court must give the statute’s language plain meaning.3
NRS 600A.030(5) says that information can be a “[t]rade secret” only if it is not “readily
ascertainable by proper means by the public or any other persons who can obtain commercial or
economic value from its disclosure or use.” Other persons in the public could have properly
obtained the information that GSR disclosed in its machine, for example, by reverse engineering;
therefore, just because Peppermill obtained the par values improperly, did not make it impossible
for Peppermill to show the par values are readily ascertainable by other people. The Court held
that GSR did not show that its jury instructions were supported by Nevada law.
Whether the district court erred in denying GSR’s motion to amend complaint
GSR filed a motion to amend its complaint with seven new claims and add Peppermill’s
general manager as a defendant, a year and a half after bringing the suit against Peppermill. GSR
explained that the amendment should be granted because its depositions with Tors brought newly
discovered information to light. The district court denied the motion to amend because the
information that GSR claimed to be new was available from the Peppermill investigation by
NGCB and was conceded in the parties’ prior pleadings. As such, the district court found that GSR
brought the motion with undue delay.
Under NRCP 15(a) the trial court has discretion to amend a motion and its decision to deny
amending a motion can only be overruled if there is a showing that the trial court abused its
discretion. GSR argued that the trial court had insufficient grounds to deny an amended complaint
because undue delay only. Yet, the Nevada Supreme Court has found that undue delay is a
sufficient reason to deny a motion to amend.4 As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied GSR’s motion to amend its complaint because GSR amended the motion with
undue delay.
Whether the district court erred in denying GSR’s motions to compel Peppermill to produce all
emails obtained by the NGCB in its investigation of the underlying matter
GSR requested that all emails that NGCB obtained from Peppermill during its investigation
be produced during discovery. Peppermill untimely objected to the request. GSR moved the court
to compel the Peppermill emails’ disclosure. It argued that Peppermill waived all objections to the
request when it untimely objected to the request.
The parties engaged in discovery conferences, negotiated the requested email production,
and then agreed to a word-search to find relevant emails. The parties did not agree upon common
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search terms. Peppermill notified GSR that it compiled the emails and transferred them onto a
computer. GSR could view the emails on the computer located at Peppermill’s counsels’ office.
Peppermill told GSR that it could use the search terms it desired, but Peppermill would review and
approve any emails GSR requested prior to producing them. GSR opposed Peppermill’s
production method, viewed the emails, and then moved to compel Peppermill to produce the
emails. The district court denied GSR’s motion to compel again and found that Peppermill satisfied
its burden of production.
GSR appealed that Peppermill’s production is unaligned with NRCP 34(b)(2)(E)(i)
because Peppermill did not provide the emails according to the usual course of business. GSR
argued that it was entitled to email copies in their electronic format. Discovery matters are in the
district court’s discretion and courts will not likely disturb a district court’s ruling unless the district
court has clearly abused its discretion.5
GSR argued that Peppermill should have produced the emails in the format that the emails
were stored on the hard drive.6 Yet, McKinney stated that a party complied with the usual course
of business requirement by allowing the requesting party to inspect documents where the
documents are maintained and how they are organized by the producing party.7
Furthermore, GSR argued that Peppermill could have produced electronic email copies
easily and that Peppermill’s inspection method was unduly burdensome to GSR. However, GSR
did not specify in its discovery request what form it would like the emails in, and as such,
Peppermill could produce the emails in any ordinary, reasonable, and usable form.8 The Court
found that Peppermill produced the emails in a reasonably usable form, that GSR’s difficulty
reviewing the emails was because its broad discovery request, and that the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it denied GSR’s motions to compel Peppermill to produce emails.
Whether the district court erred in denying GSR’s motion for case concluding sanctions under
NRCP 37
GSR moved for case-concluding sanctions against Peppermill according to NRCP 37. The
district court denied GSR’s motion without fact findings or conclusions of law. GSR appealed and
argued that the district court abused its discretion when it denied GSR’s motion for caseconcluding sanctions because there were no fact findings and law conclusions included and
Peppermill used abusive discovery practices.
Appellate courts review a district court’s decision to implement sanctions for an abuse of
discretion.9 The court, however, has a “heightened standard of review” for case-concluding
sanctions.10 District court orders denying case-concluding sanctions must be supported by a
thorough court analysis and explanation in written format that tells what factors guided the district
court’s determination about sanctions.11
On appeal, GSR only relied upon NRCP 37 when it sought case-concluding sanctions. As
such, the Court only considered if Peppermill used abusive discovery practices according to NRCP
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37. GSR did not persuade the Court upon the record’s review that Peppermill did not comply with
a discovery order, did not hide information during discovery, or that Peppermill’s discovery
practices were an “extreme situation” stated in NRCP 37 (b)–(c) that constituted case concluding
sanctions. The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied GSR’s
case concluding sanctions motion.
Whether the district court erred in excluding evidence of Peppermill obtaining par values from
other casinos
Peppermill filed motions in limine to exclude evidence that it stole other casinos’ par
values. GSR moved for a hearing to clarify when the district court granted Peppermill the motions.
The district court explained that it excluded irrelevant evidence pursuant to NRS 48.025 and that
under NRS 48.035, the evidence that Peppermill stole par values from other casinos would cause
time waste. The district court has discretion to exclude evidence that is more prejudicial than
probative, and an appellate court will not overturn a trial judge’s determination unless the trial
court abused its discretion.12
Peppermill conceded that it stole GSR’s par values from the beginning. Any probative
value in admitting this evidence is outweighed by time waste. GSR also failed to show how
Peppermill stealing other casinos’ par values is probative to GSR’s case and not prejudicial
towards Peppermill. Thus, the Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
excluded evidence that Peppermill stole par values from other casinos.
Whether the district court erred in awarding Peppermill attorney fees under NRCP 68
GSR argued that NRS 600A.060 is the sole way to recover attorney fees in a case
concerning trade secret misappropriation and that under the district court’s NRCP 68 evaluation it
did not properly consider factors in Beattie v. Thomas and Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank.
The Court disagreed with GSR.
Whether NRS 600A.060 supersedes NRCP 68
Since the Court did not review GSR’s appeal regarding an award for attorney fees for abuse
of discretion, but for an appropriate law question, the Court decided upon the issue de novo.13 The
Nevada Supreme Court has found that NRS 600A.060 and other statutes that award attorney’s fees
are “independently applicable” by examining the record to find which statute is appropriate for the
district court’s award.14 In accord with Frantz, the Court ruled that NRS Chapter 600A was not
the only way that Peppermill could obtain attorney fees; further, NRS Chapter 600A does not
preclude attorney fees recovery by NRCP 68. As such, the Court held NRS 600A.060 did not stop
Peppermill from using other statutes to recover attorney’s fees.
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Whether the district court properly considered the Beattie and Brunzell factors
When a district court uses NRCP 68 it must consider the Beattie factors when it determines
if it should award a party attorney fees.15 After the district court determines a party should be
offered attorney fees, the court must use the Brunzell factors to determine if the requested amount
is acceptable.16 Though an appellate court prefers explicit findings, if a district court fails to show
explicit findings, it has not abused its discretion.17 The district court only needs to show it
considered the factors, and there must be substantial evidence that supports the award.18
The district court demonstrated that it had used the factors under Beattie and Brunzell and
that Peppermill submitted attorneys’ invoices. The Court concluded that the district court
considered the required factors found in Beattie and Brunzell and that Peppermill’s attorney
invoices were substantial evidence to show attorney’s fees.
Conclusion
The Court affirmed the district court’s amended judgment on the jury verdict and the postjudgment orders awarding attorney fees and costs. Further, the Court affirmed the district court’s
denial of GSR’s motion for a new trial.
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